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Interday and intraday volatility: additional evidence from the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A very important issue in market microstructure analysis is the interaction 
between trading procedures and security price formation. The latter is associated 
closely with the evolution of security’s return volatilities. Empirical studies on the 
interdaily evolution of return volatilities typically find that daily open-to-open 
volatility is higher than daily close-to-close volatility. Three general explanations 
have been offered for this phenomenon: the difference in trading mechanism 
between the market’s open and close (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987), the 
monopoly power of the specialist (Stoll and Whaley, 1990), and the long halt of 
trade before the market’s open (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991).  
In this article, we examine the behaviour of both interday and intraday 
return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index in order to shed 
additional light on the issue. There have been no empirical studies made on the 
microstructure of the Chinese stock markets using intraday data. China’s stock 
exchanges are relatively new players amongst the world’s financial markets. The 
two official stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, were established in December 1990 and July 1991 
respectively. Since their establishment, they have expanded rapidly in terms of 
capitalization, turnover, and number of firms listed. In terms of market 
capitalization, the Chinese stock markets are now the second largest in the Asia-
Pacific region after Japan, and are ahead of such major markets as Australia, 
Hong Kong and Korea (Eun and Huang, 2005). Recently, in order to liberalize its 
stock markets, China’s domestic equity markets were opened to selected 
international institutional investors, designated as the so-called qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) in 2003.  The market capitalization of the SHSE was 
3,009.7 billion yuan (about US$367 billion) in 2003, 77.8% of total market 
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capitalization in all Chinese stock markets. It is obvious that the SHSE plays a 
dominating role in Chinese stock markets, which is also the reason why the 
Shanghai Composite Index was selected for this study. 
Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE is a limited order-driven 
market using electronic trading without market makers. However, the SHSE is 
unique in its institutional setting. First, there is a five minute break between the 
call auction open and normal morning open of continuous trading. We are not 
aware of any other market in the world that has such an arrangement. All other 
markets start with a call auction opening procedure and then switch to continuous 
trading straight away after the auction finishes. Second, there is a lunch break in 
the mid-day between the morning and afternoon trading sessions, the same as in 
all other Asian stock markets. Thirdly, as a result of the first and second points, 
there are technically three sessions in the Chinese stock market: the pre-open 
auction session, the morning trading session and the afternoon session. Both 
morning and afternoon sessions are thoroughly continuous markets similar to the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), which opens as a continuous market and 
remains a continuous market up to and including the close of trading. While most 
other markets (which adopt call auction for the market open) change into a 
transparent auction procedure in which information regarding order books are 
available to investors during the auction process, Chinese call auction is still 
totally without any information dissemination except for the final clearing price 
generated at the end of the auction. Meanwhile, China still maintains its unique 
five-minute break between morning call auction and morning open with 
continuous trading. The merits of these trading procedures are constantly debated 
among both academics and policy makers (Wang et al 2005, p. 7). In addition, 
unlike many other emerging markets which have stronger equity market 
integration with major markets such as through dual listing of Hong Kong stocks 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Chinese stock markets are relatively 
isolated and more independent than other markets. Therefore, the markets provide 
a clear and simple case for the research of the relations between volatility and 
trading mechanisms because there is much less correlation of both the return and 
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return volatility between the SHSE and other markets, which affects the pattern of 
the volatility of the markets under research. Thus, the SHSE offers an ideal setting 
to analyze the relations between volatility patterns and other factors such as 
trading procedures because of its unique features. 
Empirical findings based on the volatilities of interday returns and 
variance ratio indicate that the high volatility of intraday returns at the market 
opening is not mainly due to the trading mechanism (call auction) but rather due 
to the overnight trading halt. The results further suggest that the return variance in 
the active trading period (open-to-close) of the stock market is larger than that in 
the nontrading hours (close-to-open). The intraday returns and volatility provide 
further support for the results achieved by the interday data. The intraday returns 
broadly follow a U-shaped pattern (Wood et al., 1985) while the volatility of 
returns broadly follows an L-shaped pattern. This result is consistent with the 
previous findings on the Hong Kong market (Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 
2002).  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review 
on interday and intraday return volatility; Section 3 discusses the institutional 
background for the SHSE and the data; Section 4 reports and analyses the 
empirical results; In Section 5, a conclusion is made. 
 
2 Literature Review 
In an early study on the NYSE, Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll 
and Whaley (1990) compare the effects of a call auction market and continuous 
trading market on return volatility. The opening procedure of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) is essentially a call auction mechanism while all other trades 
are by the continuous trading mechanism. In the call auction mechanism, the buy 
and sell orders accumulated overnight are executed at a single price at the market 
opening. They reported that the interdaily stock returns computed using open-to-
open prices have greater variance and show more evidence of reversals than 
comparable returns computed from close-to-close prices. Amihud and Mendelson 
(1987) attribute the result to differences in trading mechanisms between the 
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opening and closing transactions and Stoll and Whaley (1990) attribute the result 
to the monopoly power of the specialist system. 
While the greater volatility at the open may be attributed in part to trading 
mechanisms used by the NYSE, research into other exchange settings suggest that 
the noisiness of opening prices may well be due to the large amount of 
‘unprocessed’ information that had accumulated overnight before the market 
open, rather than to the call auction opening procedure. Amihud and Mendelson 
(1991) examined the Japanese market where there are two trading sessions: the 
morning session and the afternoon session. Each session is based on the call 
auction for the opening and then the continuous trading session to the close. They 
find that the morning open-to-open volatility is high, but not the afternoon open-
to-open volatility, and conclude that it is caused by the preceding long period of 
non-trading rather than the trading mechanism. Similarly, Amihud et al (1990) 
found that on the Milan Stock Exchange, where the market opens with continuous 
trading and moves to a call market, the call trading actually exhibits lower 
volatility. It is also consistent with Choe and Shin’s (1993) findings in the Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE) that the close-to-close volatility is higher when the market 
closes (in the morning) in continuous trade than when the market closes (in the 
morning) in call auction.  
All the above-mentioned markets, including the NYSE, the AMEX, the 
LSE, and Asian markets including Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), the KSE and the 
SHSE to be discussed in this paper, open with a call market and then switch to a 
continuous market. Unlike these markets, the SEHK opens as a continuous market 
and remains a continuous market up to and including the close of trading. If halt 
of trade were the major reason, open-to-open volatility in the SEHK would be 
higher without a call auction. What Lam and Tong (1999) found is that the open-
to-open volatility is actually a bit lower than the close-to-close volatility. Using 
one-minute interval interday data, they found two humps in the interdaily 
volatility pattern, a large one in the morning session and a small one in the 
afternoon session. They then argue that this is probably due to clustering of 
trading at these particularly times.     
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Gerety and Mulherin (1994) estimate transitory volatility throughout the 
trading day based on forty years of hourly Dow Jones sixty-five Composite price 
index data. They hypothesize that if the opening auction is responsible for higher 
open-to-open volatility, a sudden drop in interdaily variance after the open should 
be observed. Instead, their findings are in contrast with their hypothesis and the 
interday 24-hour volatilities decline steady, reflecting information processing. 
Hence, halt of trade seems more likely to be the driving force rather than a call 
auction process as argued by Amihud and Mendelson (1987). Overall, although 
there is still no consensus, the majority of the research works support the notion 
that it is overnight trading halt rather than an auction procedure that is the source 
of the higher open interday volatility. 
In addition to the examination of the interday return volatility, intraday 
return volatility of share prices has been found to follow a particular pattern, 
which is associated with the market microstructure characteristics of the stock 
exchange. Wood et al. (1985) are the first to identify the distinct U-shaped return 
and return volatility pattern over the trading day. Later, both Harris (1986) and 
Jain and Joh (1988) reported a significant U-shaped intraday return and return 
volatility patterns in stock trading in the NYSE.  
Recently, Ozenbas, et al (2002) have examined intraday share price 
volatility over the year 2000 for five markets: the NYS, Nasdaq, the LSE, 
Euronext Paris and Deutsche Borse. They observed a U-shaped intraday volatility 
pattern, a particularly sharp spike for the opening half hour, and a general level of 
intraday volatility that is accentuated vis-à-vis volatility over longer differencing 
intervals in each of these markets. They suggest that the volatility accentuation is 
attributable to spreads, market impact, price discovery and momentum trading.  
The theoretical explanations for the behaviour of these variables of the U-
shaped patterns are not easy. Kyle (1985) suggests that traders can be classified 
into three classes: private information traders, random liquidity traders, and 
market makers. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) 
add a fourth type of trader to Kyle’s model: discretionary liquidity traders. They 
take into account the impact, the costs, the size and the time of the trade. They 
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suggest that public and private information, and trading noise are the causes of a 
systematic pattern in return volatilities, which leads traders to minimize trading 
during the periods of the open and close of the market.  
When public information is released during the non-trading period 
(overnight), the liquidity traders (random liquidity traders and discretionary 
liquidity traders) would be more active at the open of the market. When the 
market is near to close, the informed traders, who get access to private 
information during the trading hours, would be more active towards the close of 
trading before the information becomes public during the overnight non-trading 
periods. This public/private information and noise trading hypotheses are well 
supported by the empirical evidence of a U-shaped pattern in return volatilities 
(French and Roll, 1986 and Stoll and Whaley, 1990). 
In addition to the evidence from the US market, there are some studies on 
emerging markets, particularly the Asian stock exchanges with their two trading 
sessions during a day. Chang et al. (1993) analyzes intraday returns and return 
volatilities for the index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and find a double U-shaped 
return pattern corresponding to its two trading sessions. Consistent to that reported 
for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Cheung et al. (1994) also reported a double U-
shaped volatility pattern for 15-minute intervals using the Hang Seng Index 
during the period April 1986 to December 1990. Examining the intra-daily 
seasonalities of the stock returns on the Turkish Stock Market in the period from 
1996 to 1999, Bildik (2001) finds that stock return volatility follows a W-shaped 
pattern over the trading day, or more precisely a U-shaped pattern for the morning 
trading session and an L-shaped for the afternoon session on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. Copeland and Jones (2002) provide evidence that for the intraday 
effects in the Korean market, there exists a U-shaped pattern over the day. They 
find that both volume and volatility are found to be consistently higher at the start 
of the trading day. Without market makers in these Asian markets, relatively 
higher mean return and volatility (measured by standard deviation) at the 
openings of the trading sessions in these markets, irrespective of whether either 
auction or continuous procedure or both are used for their market open, are found 
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by a majority of authors to be significantly generated by the accumulated 
overnight information and the closed-market effect (halt of trade).  
Recently, the Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) introduced a pre-trading 
routine (a periodic auction) that allowed brokers to place orders into the 
Exchange’s computerized matching system for a period of 30 minutes prior to 
market’s opening. Using 5-minute intraday data of the thirty-two most actively 
trading stocks for the period of six months prior to, and after, the introduction of 
this new system in August 2000, Young et al (2002) investigated the impact of the 
changes on volatility and the price discovery process and found that the pre-
trading session significantly reduced opening stock market volatility, therefore 
helping in the price discovery process and the development of a more efficient 
and transparent market. The Opening vitality in the SSE dropped by over sixty-
percent after the introduction of the pre-trading routine. Overall, although an 
intraday volatility pattern does not relate a higher open volatility to any driving 
forces, it does reveal the price discovery process and the pattern of the volatility, 
which provides further evidence to support the results found by using interdaily 
volatility.  
 Similar to Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990), 
we compare open-to-open and close-to-close volatility. However, this 
investigation is not adequate because even in the NYSE it is not clear whether or 
not the opening is unique while the closing is similar to other times of a day. 
When there are two trading halts during a trading day: one one-and-half hour 
lunch break and one five-minute trading halt after the morning call auction in the 
SHSE, comparisons between open-to-open return variance and close-to-close 
return variance do not reveal much about trading mechanisms. Thus, following 
Gerety and Mulherin (1994), Lam and Tong (1999) and Choe and Shin (1993), we 
expand our tests to compare open-to-open return variance to interday return 
variance measured at each 5-minute interval during a trading day as well as five-
minute intraday return and return volatility in the following sessions. 
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3        Trading Systems and Dataset   
 
3.1  Trading Systems 
The trading system in the SHSE is based on the electronic consolidated 
open limit order book (COLOB).  Trading is carried out on the exchange in two 
sessions: the morning session from 09:30 to 11:30 and the afternoon session from 
13:00 to 15:00. Before the morning session, there is a 10-minute open call 
(consolidated) auction session, which starts at 09:15 and ends at 09:25, for the 
determination of the centralized competitive opening price. During this 10-minute 
call auction period, investors can place limit orders and participate in the opening 
auction, but no orders will be allowed to be withdrawn during this period of time. 
There is also no information regarding order books available to investors during 
the auction process, except for the final clearing price generated at the end of the 
auction. Therefore, the morning call auction is totally without any information 
dissemination. Orders that are not executed in the opening auction are 
automatically transferred to the period of continuous trading. The determined 
opening price at 09:25 is continued to 09:30.  
After a lunch break, the market reopens in the afternoon directly with a 
continuous auction without the consolidated auction. During the two continuous 
trading sessions, the electronic system is based on the matching of orders for the 
consecutive bidding according to price and time priorities. Closing prices of the 
stocks of the trading day in the SHSE are generated by taking a weighted average 
of the trading prices of the final minute of each trading day1. The information of 
the best three offers and bids and their associated volume as well as the price and 
volume for the latest transaction on the stock exchanges during the continuous 
trading sessions must be displayed on computer terminals viewable by investors 
on and off both exchanges. The market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays and 
other public holidays announced by the exchange. 
                                                 
1 Before December 1, 2001, the Shanghai Stock Exchange uses the last trading price as the close 
price. 
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There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the 
market. Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market 
order or limit order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading 
system. At the end of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB. 
There are no other sophisticated order types, such as trading-at-open, trading-at-
close, stop orders, buy-at-minus and sell-at-plus, which are supported by the 
trading system. The minimum tick sizes for all stocks are 1 cent (RMB0.01 
Yuan). Shares can’t be sold on the same day once they are bought. The minimum 
trading size for purchase is 100 shares, while there is no minimum requirement for 
selling shares. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are strictly 
prohibited. During trading sessions on the SHSE, a stock is allowed to trade at a 
price plus or minus 10% from the previous day’s closing price in order to avoid 
sharp price increases caused by ‘buy manias’ and sharp declines caused by ‘sell 
panics’. 
Overall, the operation of the SHSE is different from some other two-
session order-driven markets. For example, the SEHK has a thoroughly 
continuous order-driven (i.e. no opening call market) trading, while in the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, the periodic auction is used twice a day at the opening of both 
the morning and afternoon session and continuous order-driven trading markets in 
both the morning and the afternoon sessions in the trading day. In addition, there 
are also some differences in trading rules such as price limit, tick size and short-
selling restriction between the SHSE and those more similar order-driven Asian 
markets. The Chinese stock markets are also different from all the other markets 
with morning auction opening procedure: not only due to the fact that there is no 
specialists involved in the markets, but also the Chinese stock markets take five-
minute break between the periodic auction and the morning session with 
continuous trading mechanism.  
A further difference lies in the broader nature of the trading environment. 
Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE has a relative immature 
infrastructure such as an inadequate disclosure, an opaque legal and governance 
framework, and an inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced 
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regulator with a limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and 
an enormous member of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget 
constraint, gives informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to 
earn a profit at the expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004). 
 
3.2  Dataset  
 
This paper uses intraday data from the Shanghai Composite Price Index, 
which is a value weighted index of all common stocks listed on the SHSE2. The 
Shanghai Composite Index took December 19, 1990 as its base day to calculate 
the base market capitalization. The index is the most widely-quoted index of the 
Chinese stock markets, both locally and internationally. We examine the five-
minute interval Shanghai Composite Index series covering the three-year trading 
period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2002, a total of 716 trading days 
with more than 30,000 observations.  The data were provided by the SIRCA. The 
dataset of the Shanghai Composite Index records information on the time-stamped 
transactions, including the code, the order of time interval, the trading date, the 
day, trading time, the opening value, the highest value, the lowest value and the 
closing value in each time interval in each trading day.  
  
3.3     Returns 
 
Interday returns are calculated as the logarithmic percentage returns of the 
Index on day t. Three interday open-to-open returns at the auction open at 09:25, 
the morning open at 09:30 and the afternoon open at 13:30 are computed as 
                                                 
2 All the common stocks issued and traded in the SHSE include both the A-shares and B-shares. 
The A-shares are domestic ordinary shares denominated and traded in RMB by Chinese citizens 
while the B-shares are ordinary shares offered to foreign investors, denominated in RBM, but 
traded in foreign currency. Moreover, while there is a separate auction procedure implemented 
five-minutes before the normal morning opens with continuous trading at 10.00 each trading day 
for the A-share market, the B-share market just opens at 10.00 with a continuous trading 
mechanism. However, the market capitalization of the A-shares is about 10-20 times larger than 
that of the B-shares and also the A-shares are much more actively traded each day. For this reason, 
we treat all the shares constructing the Shanghai Composite Index trade the same way as the A-
shares in the SHSE with a separate auction procedure prior to the market open.  
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ln[open(t)/open(t-1)], while the interday close-to-close return at any other 5-
minute interval is calculated as ln[close(t)/close(t-1)]. 
Intraday interval returns are computed by taking the first difference of the 
natural logarithm of the successive interval values of the indices. Rt, the return on 
stock indices at the interval t, is computed as ln (Pt / Pt-1), where, for each interval 
during the trading day, Pt is the closing value of the interval at time t and Pt-1 is the 
closing value of proceeding interval at time t-1.  
As there are two sessions in the trading day, the 5-minute returns consist 
of 48 observations over the two sessions from 09:30 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to 
15:00 in a trading day with 34,368 observations over the three years. The first and 
last 5-minute intervals for the morning session are from 09:30 to 09:35 and from 
11:25 to 11:30, respectively. The first and last 5-minute intervals for the afternoon 
session are from 13:00 to 13:05 and from 14:55 to 15:00, respectively. Thus, the 
48 5-minute intervals throughout the trading day break up into 24 intervals for the 
morning session and 24 intervals for the afternoon session. 
For calculating the 5-minute intraday returns, if there is no trading at the 
end of the 5 minutes, the closest trading price to the end of the 5-minute is the 
closing value of that 5-minute interval. The return for the first 5-minute interval of 
the trading day is calculated by comparing the closing value at t1 (09:35) with the 
closing value at time t0 (09:30) when the trading starts. The close-to-open 
(overnight or non-trading) return is computed by comparing the closing value at 
time t0 (09:30) with the last value (closing value) at time t48 (15:00) of the 
previous day-end. Open-to-close returns are computed by comparing the last 
value (closing value) at time t48 (15:00) with the opening value (closing value at 
time t0) at 09:30 of the trading day
3.  
In the study, parametric tests, such as the mean equality test, and the non-
parametric tests (such as Kruskal-Wallis test, Levene test and modified Levene 
test, Brown and Forsythe test), are applied. Nonparametric tests are shown to be 
                                                 
3 Another way is to standardise return series by subtracting each observation from the mean of the sun of all 
corresponding intervals and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of its corresponding 5-
minute interval. The results may be obtained upon request. 
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statistically superior to parametric tests in detecting abnormal price reactions for 
small time intervals (Mucklow, 1994). Kruskal-Wallis tests report the asymptotic 
normal approximation to the U-statistic (with continuity and tie correction) and 
the p-values for a two-sided test. The Levene test (Levene, 1960) and the Brown 
and Forsythe (1974) test (a modified Levene test) are used for testing the equality 
of variances. The Levene test is based on an analysis of variance of the absolute 
difference from the mean. The Brown and Forsythe test employs absolute 
deviations from the class means. When empirical distributions are not normal, the 
Brown and Forsythe test can provide robust results based on deviations from the 
median.  
 
4 Empirical analysis 
 
4.1       Interday return volatility  
 
We first analyse interday mean return and return variances measured at 
various times of the day by rolling the time from the auction open to the afternoon 
close by 5 minutes. Table 1 and Figure 1 shows the interday descriptive statistics 
of mean interday returns, variances and the tests of variance ratio for the call 
auction open (09:25), the morning open (09:30) (in the continuous trading), first 
interval at 09:35, other related 5-minute intervals. In Figure 1, the bottom line 
represents the plot of interdaily mean return through time. The mean return has a 
big drop at the morning open at 09:30 after the minor negative opening at the call 
auction. Within the next half hour until 10:30, the mean return first jumps back to 
near the auction open level and then constantly declines before a slightly rise at 
the market close.  
The line at the top shows the interdaily volatility through time. Variance 
ratios for each interday return compared to the afternoon close-to-close are 
reported as the line in the middle. According to Amihud and Mendelson (1987), 
one would expect that the variance ratio test of the call auction would be larger 
and significantly different, but the variance ratio test of all other interday returns 
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in the continuous trading period, are not larger and significantly different 
compared to the close-to-close interday return; the market volatility in the call 
auction may indeed be affected by the call auction method alone. 
When we compare the variance ratios between the call auction and the 
afternoon open, the result may suggest that call auction trading alone increases 
return volatility. The result (1.23) is basically consistent with the variance ratio of 
1.20 found by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and of 1.13 found by Stoll and 
Whaley (1990), who show that the interday 24-hour open-to-open return variance 
is higher than the interday 24-hour close-to-close return variance in the US stock 
market. We think that the pattern documented here is different from that in the US 
market although there is not any study that analyses a less-than-hourly intraday 
pattern of interday return volatility in the U. S. markets.  
Our results reveal that the return variance is the second highest at the 
auction open at 09:25, 5min later when the markets start with continuous trading, 
the variance reaches its highest during the morning open, before falling back at 
09:35. The variances at these three points of times (2.535, 2.671 and 2.517) are 
the greatest, and the variance ratio tests indicate that all these first three interday 
return variances are all significantly different from the interday close-to-close 
interday return variance.  After the lunch break, interday return variance increases 
and the variance ratios are larger than one for the first three 5-minute intervals 
(although they are not significantly different from the interday close-to-close in 
the SHSE) before the ratios fall below 1 for the rest of the afternoon until the 
market’s close. It is interesting to note that the variance of open-to-open returns in 
the continuous morning opening at 09:30 is actually higher than the variance of 
the open-to-open returns at the auction opening. The higher open-to-open return 
variance at the morning open than that during the auction open might be caused 
by the halt-of-trading effect, rather than the accumulated information during that 
five-minute period. It is too short a time period between these two openings to 
judge the effect of the auction open and the morning open with continuous 
trading. However, the arrangement of a five-minute break between the call 
auction and the beginning of the continuous trading is more than necessary and 
 15 
should be cancelled due to the extra volatility created by this mechanism which 
certainly fails to improve the market quality.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Thus, the hypothesis that the volatility is entirely caused by trading 
mechanisms at the market open is rejected because there was no observed sudden 
drop in interdaily variance after the market open according to the hypothesis 
suggested by Gerety and Mulherin (1994). Rather, this result provides evidence to 
suggest that on the Chinese stock market, the accumulated overnight information 
not the halt of trade is the driving force for higher return volatility at the market 
open. The highest volatility at the morning open with continuous trading is more 
consistent with the effect of the lack of trading continuity due to the trading halt. 
To a much lesser extent, a high level of interday volatility at the afternoon market 
open could also be attributed to the lack of trading continuity and the information 
accumulated during that lunch break. The effect of these factors should be much 
less than the other two breaks due to the statistical insignificance of the high 
volatility ratio tests during the afternoon open.  
 
 
4.2 Volatility in Trading and non-Trading Periods 
 
Studies focused on the volatility in trading and non-trading periods will 
help us to understand the price formation of security and its association with 
trading mechanisms the exchange adopts. Existing studies found that the return 
variance in the active trading hours (open-to-close) of the security market is larger 
than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open) (French and Roll, 1986; Barclay, 
el al, 1990; Stoll and Whaley, 1990). French and Roll (1986) test the private 
information hypothesis and report that return variances are reduced by both the 
election day closing and the exchange holidays, whereas Barclay et al. (1990) 
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support the same hypothesis using an opposite case in which return variances are 
increased by Saturday trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The large difference 
between the variances of the trading and the non-trading periods is mainly 
attributable to the greater intensity of information arriving during the business 
hours. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of mean return and variance during 
the overnight period (close-to-open or C-O), morning session, lunch break, 
afternoon session, and daily trading period (open-to-close or O-C).  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
In Table 2, we show that the volatility in terms of the variance of the open-
to-close period is more than four times that of the close-to-open (overnight) period 
(1.703% versus 0.388%). This is consistent with the U.S. results as reported by 
Lockwood and Linn (1990) in that the open-to-close return variance exceeds that 
of close-to-open return by a factor of 2.34 to 3.37. The results also support the 
hypothesis that private information is disclosed during trading hours. It should be 
noted that the return volatility in the morning trading session (0.604%) is greater 
than the volatility measured during the afternoon trading session (0.529%). This 
confirms further that private information is not produced at a constant rate even 
during the trading period. It also implies fewer price reversals occur as trade 
proceeds. 
In terms of unit time volatility, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that 
the two-hour midday break in Japan has a higher return volatility than the 
overnight break. They argue that this difference could result from the greater 
intensity of information arrival during the day compared to the overnight period. 
In contrast, Lam and Tong (1999) show that an overnight variance of 0.027 is 
more than double the midday break variance of 0.001 in terms of unit time 
volatility. They argue that the higher overnight variance was attributed to 
probably the trading of some component stocks in London overnight. The results 
in Table 2 also show that the per-hour overnight volatility is five times greater 
than the lunch break in the Shanghai index (0.021% vs. 0.004%), which is 
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consistent with the findings of Lam and Tong (1999) for the Hong Kong market 
but inconsistent with those of Amihud and Mendelson (1991) for the Japanese 
market. Without the complication like Hong Kong market, a lower volatility 
during the 11:30 to 13:00 period could just reflect a lower intensity of new 
information arriving over these one and half hours than that overnight.  
Meanwhile, the sum (1.527) of the mean variances of the four periods, 
including the morning session (0.604), lunch (0.006), afternoon (0.529) and 
overnight (0.388) is less than 25.73% of the mean daily variance of close-to-close 
return (2.056)4. These results are consistent with Chang et al (1993) and Lam and 
Tong (1999) but not with Amihud and Mendelson (1991) or Bildik (2001). 
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that the sum of the variances of the four 
separate time intervals, including overnight, morning session, lunch break, and 
afternoon session, exceeds the close-to-close return variance by 21.7%. Our result 
implies that the covariances between each pair of consecutive trading periods are 
positive. This result supports the results of Lam and Tong’s (1999) explanation 
for the difference between the results of Amihud and Mendelson’s (1991) and 
theirs to the fact the former looked at individual stocks instead of looking at a 
stock index. Individual stocks tend to exhibit negative autocorrelation due to the 
bid-ask bounce, whereas stock indices tend to exhibit positive correlation due to 
various reasons (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). 
 
4.3       Intraday Return and volatility  
  
Table 3 and Figure 2 provide the 5-minute intraday returns (in percentage) 
for the year 2000-2002. From the bottom lines of Table 3, negative mean 5-
minute returns (“All”) are observed during the 3-year period and they are close to 
zero, equal to -0.0014%. The skewness is generally not obvious but the values of 
excess kurtosis are larger during the three-year period. The Jarque-Bera and 
                                                 
4 The computation for these return series are for Morning: 09:30 – 11:30, for lunch break: 11:30am 
– 13:00 (afternoon opening price), for afternoon: 13:00 – 15:00 and for overnight: 15:00 – 09:30 
next day. 
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Anderson-Darling tests of normality have p-values less than 0.01, thus each test 
would reject the null hypothesis of normality. These indicated that the returns data 
is non-normal and has a fat-tailed distribution on the Chinese stock market.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The right-hand plot of Figure 2 show that there are large, positive mean 
returns at the beginning of the trading day and a big upward increase in returns at 
the end of the trading day, which presents typical U-shaped patterns. These 
intraday effects are consistent with the previous literature on the US market 
(Wood et al, 1985; Harris, 1986; Jain and Joh, 1988; Lockwood and Linn, 1990) 
and other countries such as the Hong Kong market (Cheung, 1995) and the 
Turkish market (Bildik, 2001). It is interesting to see these price changes (high 
returns) in the morning open in the Shanghai index. Possible reasons are the 
overnight halt of trade and the effect of accumulated information released, which 
reflects the new price-discovery process, and the high returns at the trading 
closing can be attributed to informed traders with private information for the next 
day’s opening. Different informed and uninformed traders may lead to new price 
discovery. In addition, large closing returns imply that the specialist-related 
explanation of Miller (1989) should be refuted in the Chinese stock market since 
there is no specialist system. The findings show that the large price changes at 
market openings and closings needs to be improved in the Chinese exchange, 
which underscores the importance of making the trading systems more efficient.  
In Table 4, results of the F-tests for the equality of mean return show that 
the null hypothesis for equality of intraday returns across the 5-minute intervals is 
rejected at a 1% level. The results of KW-tests for the equality of mean return 
median confirm that the null hypothesis for equality of intraday return medians 
across the 5-minute intervals is also rejected at a 1% level. Both the F-tests and 
KW-tests have consistent results. This result confirms that there is a strong 
systematic intraday return pattern existing on the Chinese stock market. It should 
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be noted that the first two intervals from 09:30 to 09:35 and from 09:35 to 09:40 
of the morning session are significantly important at a 1% level for the index. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 5 and Figure 2 present the standard deviation of the mean 5-minute 
returns. With the largest volatility at the beginning of the morning session, the two 
indices have distinct L-shaped patterns, inconsistent with the U-shaped patterns 
observed in the US market by Wood et al. (1985), Harris (1986), Jain and Joh 
(1988) and Goodhart and O’Hara (1997)).  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The mean volatility of 0.363% during the opening, or the first 5-minute 
interval, is almost triple that of the rest of the day. Volatility goes down sharply 
during the next 25 minutes. The lowest volatility of 0.096% occurs before the 5-
minute ending of the morning session. The volatility begins to rise in the last 5-
minutes of the morning session to 0.123%. At the beginning of the afternoon 
session volatility continues to rise to a higher level, 0.194%, in the first 5 minutes, 
which represents the largest volatility throughout the afternoon session. After that 
it comes down again (with lowest 0.093% at 13:20) and fluctuates until the end of 
the day to 0.116%, which is 1/3 of its value at the opening. A large opening 
volatility supports the fact that the mean return at the opening is significantly 
higher than that of most other intervals during the day.  
In Table 5, the results from the Levene-tests show that the null hypothesis 
of equality of volatility of mean 5-minute returns across the 5-minute intervals is 
rejected at a 1% level. The Brown-Forsythe tests have the same results as the 
Levene tests.  Thus, intraday volatility in terms of the variance of 5-minute returns 
is not distributed equally across the 5-minute intervals and the time-of-day effect 
on the intraday return volatilities can not be rejected. These results support the 
observation made before that there are systematic intraday volatility patterns 
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existing in the Chinese stock market. It could be said that volatility resembles an 
L-shaped pattern if the slight increase in volatility at the afternoon opening 
(13:00) were to be ignored, which is in contrast to the U-shaped volatility patterns 
documented in previous literature in most other markets.  
The high volatility at the open would be evidence for price change during 
the opening processing period. During the trading halts, information released by 
the central government, related management agencies and the companies, about 
macroeconomic, social or political news, and the trading information, 
significantly affect the market’s outlook as well as investment decisions5. On the 
other hand, there are slightly higher volatilities at the morning closing; the 
volatilities continuously fall during the last few five-minutes until the market’s 
close in the afternoon session, which is not consistent with the pattern 
documented in the US market - rather it is consistent with the Hong Kong market 
(Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 2002). One possible reason is that the 
market portfolio’s rebalancing force, which causes higher volatility at the close in 
the US market, does not exist on the Chinese market. The size of the market 
portfolio funds for investors is still fairly small and the management of these 
funds is still relatively premature compared to their western counterparts. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The object of this paper is to examine the behaviour of interday and 
intraday return and return volatility in the SHSE, which is a limit order-driven 
markets using electronic trading without market makers.  
The volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests suggest an L-
shaped pattern, or more precisely two L-shaped patterns starting with a small 
hump during both the morning and afternoon session. During the morning 
opening, both auction and continuous trading have much higher interday 
volatility. High volatility of intraday returns for the market’s open is not mainly 
                                                 
5 In China, most important events, including government policy information and firm-specific 
information, are released in the evening. 
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due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to 
both the overnight trading halt and accumulated information. By comparing the 
volatility of trading and non-trading periods, we also found that the return 
variance in the active trading period (open-to-close) of the stock market is larger 
than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open), while overnight volatility is 
bigger than that of the lunch break.  
This L-shaped interday volatility is also supported by the similarly shaped 
intraday volatility pattern, while intraday returns do actually follow the U-shaped 
pattern as suggested by Wood et al. (1985). The noticeable L-shaped volatility 
pattern is due to flow of information and market microstructure, which are related 
to the generation and dissemination of information, the arrival of orders and the 
rules and institutional features of a stock market that determine how orders are 
transformed into trades.  
Overnight information has an enormous impact on stock volatility. This 
implies that accumulated information (public and private) from overnight is 
reflected in prices immediately at the opening of the day. Therefore, in contrast to 
other 5-minute intraday price changes that reflect the news released during the 
corresponding 5-minute interval, the first few 5-minute return volatilities reflect 
the assimilating information that was released and accumulated due to a much 
longer overnight trading halt. These abnormal trading activities of different 
traders in the market’s opening are related to their different information (public 
and private) that causes the L-shaped volatility in the markets.  
Furthermore, private information is most likely asymmetric among 
investors. Private information accumulated over the trading halt is incorporated in 
the stock prices when the trading opens. Traders who have no access to private 
information would trade on random factors unrelated to information. Insiders 
including manipulators may try to trade along with the trading activities of private 
information traders in order to obtain the private information indirectly.  
The purpose of using the auction procedure is to stabilize prices after the 
overnight trading halt. However, the blind arrangement actually defeated the 
whole purpose of providing this open procedure particularly in the case of the 
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Chinese stock markets. The Chinese market with its short history is dominated by 
high share of domestic inexperienced investors in share trading. They tend to 
show severe ‘herd behaviour’. These small liquidity providers do not have much 
interest in participating in the morning call auction and even the following first 
few minutes after the market opens with continuous trading at 09:30 due to the 
information asymmetry.  
Meanwhile, there is wide spread manipulation due to its special 
shareholding structure and general trading environment. Like many other 
emerging markets, the SHSE has a relatively immature infrastructure such as an 
inadequate disclosure system, an opaque legal and governance framework and an 
inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced regulator with a 
limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and an enormous 
number of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget constraints, gives 
informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to earn a profit at the 
expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004).  
The market makers such as the specialists on the NYSE and, to a lesser 
extent, dealers in the LSE are involved markedly at the market call auction in 
order to exploit monopolist profits due to the asymmetric information between 
them and normal liquidity providers. Chinese insiders and manipulators were not 
able to do this presumably because there is no sufficient liquidity during the open 
process. Instead, Chinese insiders and manipulators intend to manipulate market 
prices by placing and withdrawing their offers during the call auction process and 
when the market opens. That is the reason for a higher volatility at these two 
opens in the morning.  
Having the blind auction reduced an auction’s role of producing an 
effective market clearing price at the end of the auction, since it pushes away 
many uninformed investors who are instead choosing to participate in the more 
transparent continuous trading period. Moreover, the five-minute break after 
auction creates another trading halt effect. This trading halt effect does not 
necessarily lead to an accumulation of substantial information during such a short 
period of time compared to the overnight halt but rather brings uncertainty into 
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the market when it opens again. In addition to the delaying the participation of 
uninformed small investors from the blind auction, the interday volatility at the 
market open at 09.30 thus reaches its highest level during a trading day.  
In conclusion, the high volatilities observed at the market open are costly 
to the market in aggregate, which discourages trade and make investors’ returns 
more uncertain. The five-minute break after the auction and blind auction 
procedure itself are the two major reasons for the high intraday volatility 
observed. Converting the blind procedure into a transparent one and eliminating 
the five-minute break after the auction should improve the market quality in terms 
of lower volatility at the market open.    
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Table 1      Interday 24-hour returns, return volatility and variance ratio test, the Shanghai Composite Index, 
2000 - 2002 
No Time Mean Variance 
Variance 
Ratio 
Test 
P 
Value   No Time Mean Variance 
Variance 
Ratio 
Test 
P 
Value  
0 Auction Call -0.0002 2.535 1.233*** 0.005          
 
Morning 
Open -0.0034 2.671 1.299*** 0.000    
Afternoon 
Open -0.0020 2.062 0.999 0.993  
1 09:35-09:35 -0.0003 2.517 1.224*** 0.007   25 13:05-13:05 -0.0025 2.189 1.065 0.401  
2 09:40-09:40 0.0002 1.997 0.971 0.698   26 13:10-13:10 -0.0030 2.190 1.065 0.398  
3 09:45-09:45 0.0006 1.824 0.887 0.110   27 13:15-13:15 -0.0031 2.080 1.012 0.875  
4 09:50-09:50 0.0006 1.879 0.914 0.230   28 13:20-13:20 -0.0030 1.995 0.97 0.688  
5 09:55-09:55 0.0006 1.908 0.928 0.321   29 13:25-13:25 -0.0031 1.991 0.968 0.668  
6 10:00-10:00 0.0006 1.926 0.937 0.385   30 13:30-13:30 -0.0034 2.024 0.985 0.835  
7 10:05-10:05 0.0006 1.879 0.954 0.531   31 13:35-13:35 -0.0038 2.024 0.984 0.834  
8 10:10-10:10 0.0006 1.908 0.959 0.576   32 13:40-13:40 -0.0039 2.010 0.978 0.766  
9 10:15-10:15 0.0006 1.926 0.98 0.790   33 13:45-13:45 -0.0038 2.004 0.975 0.734  
10 10:20-10:20 0.0004 1.961 0.995 0.949   34 13:50-13:50 -0.0037 1.980 0.963 0.615  
11 10:25-10:25 0.0000 1.971 0.998 0.978   35 13:55-13:55 -0.0038 1.956 0.951 0.506  
12 10:30-10:30 -0.0003 2.015 0.98 0.786   36 14:00-14:00 -0.0041 1.915 0.932 0.345  
13 10:35-10:35 -0.0003 2.046 0.971 0.697   37 14:05-14:05 -0.0040 1.947 0.947 0.467  
14 10:40-10:40 -0.0002 2.051 0.959 0.574   38 14:10-14:10 -0.0038 1.991 0.968 0.668  
15 10:45-10:45 -0.0002 2.014 0.959 0.576   39 14:15-14:15 -0.0037 1.977 0.962 0.602  
16 10:50-10:50 -0.0004 1.996 0.935 0.368   40 14:20-14:20 -0.0039 1.935 0.942 0.421  
17 10:55-11:55 -0.0005 1.971 0.912 0.219   41 14:25-14:25 -0.0044 1.930 0.939 0.400  
18 11:00-11:00 -0.0009 1.971 0.898 0.152   42 14:30-14:30 -0.0047 1.926 0.937 0.385  
19 11:05-11:05 -0.0011 1.922 0.891 0.125   43 14:35-14:35 -0.0047 1.924 0.936 0.376  
20 11:10-11:10 -0.0014 1.875 0.911 0.211   44 14:40-14:40 -0.0053 1.944 0.946 0.457  
21 11:15-11:15 -0.0012 1.846 0.916 0.243   45 14:45-14:45 -0.0057 1.982 0.964 0.628  
22 11:20-11:20 -0.0013 1.865 0.907 0.193   46 14:50-14:50 -0.0056 2.000 0.973 0.714  
23 11:25-11:25 -0.0015 1.868 0.909 0.200   47 14:55-14:55 -0.0056 2.024 0.984 0.834  
24 
11:30-11:30 
(MorningClose) -0.0018 1.916 0.932 0.349   48 
15:00-15:00 
(Close-Close) -0.0049 2.056 1 1  
Notes:   **: 5% level of significance.   ***: 1% level of significance. 
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Table 2    Descriptive statistics for the returns of the trading and non-trading period of 
the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002 (In percentage) 
 
  Shanghai Composite Index in Percentage 
     
    Variance 
 Time Mean Variance Ratio 
     
1 Overnight 0.0655 0.388 0.733 
2 Morning -0.1407 0.604 1.142 
3 Lunch Break 0.0083 0.006 0.011 
4 Afternoon 0.0705 0.529 1.000 
 
(1)+(2)+ 
(3)+(4)  1.527  
     
5 Open-close -0.0665 1.703 3.219 
6 Close-close -0.0049 2.056 3.887 
Note: The computation for these return series are for morning 09:30 – 11:30, for lunch break: 11:30 – 
13:00 (afternoon opening price), for afternoon: 13:00 – 15:00 and for overnight: 15:00 – 09:30 next day. 
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Table 3    Descriptive statistics of the intraday 5-minute returns in percentages of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002 
No Interval Size Mean Max Min. Std. Skew. ExKurt. J.Bera Cum.  No Interval Size Mean Max Min. Std. Skew. ExKurt. J.Bera Cum. 
1 9:30-9:35 716 0.0306 2.39 -2.39 0.363 -0.02 12.24 2545.1 0.03  25 13:00-13:05 716 0.0036 1.06 -2.27 0.194 -2.047 32.27 26061 -0.137 
2 9:35-9:40 716 -0.0403 1.62 -1.37 0.266 0.615 9.93 1477.7 -0.01  26 13:05-13:10 716 -0.0252 0.73 -0.49 0.091 1.114 15.19 4584.1 -0.162 
3 9:40-9:45 716 -0.0110 1.18 -1.09 0.201 0.774 9.65 1390.4 -0.02  27 13:10-13:15 716 -0.0179 1.3 -0.54 0.106 2.93 40.33 42598 -0.18 
4 9:45-9:50 716 -0.0025 0.88 -0.83 0.151 0.252 8.19 812.5 -0.02  28 13:15-13:20 716 -0.0049 0.95 -0.71 0.093 0.952 28.76 19911 -0.185 
5 9:50-9:55 716 -0.0070 0.74 -0.73 0.151 -0.33 7.78 694.4 -0.03  29 13:20-13:25 716 -0.0002 0.72 -0.42 0.097 0.581 10.48 1711.3 -0.185 
6 9:55-10:00 716 -0.0103 0.73 -0.82 0.141 -0.11 9.31 1189.1 -0.04  30 13:25-13:30 716 0.0027 0.68 -0.49 0.109 0.376 9.07 1116.6 -0.182 
7 10:00-10:05 716 -0.0080 0.85 -0.76 0.125 -0.22 10.11 1515.1 -0.05  31 13:30-13:35 716 0.0056 0.83 -0.46 0.117 0.463 9.44 1263.7 -0.177 
8 10:05-10:10 716 -0.0090 0.87 -1.25 0.153 -0.91 14.45 4013.7 -0.06  32 13:35-13:40 716 0.008 0.9 -0.63 0.114 0.668 12.94 3003.3 -0.169 
9 10:10-10:15 716 -0.0062 0.95 -0.67 0.135 0.159 9.51 1268.4 -0.06  33 13:40-13:45 716 0.0124 0.65 -0.58 0.114 0.283 8.41 883 -0.156 
10 10:15-10:20 716 -0.0114 0.93 -0.88 0.15 -0.13 11.59 2203.4 -0.08  34 13:45-13:50 716 0.0088 1.06 -1.02 0.134 0.663 18.5 7215.8 -0.148 
11 10:20-10:25 716 -0.0071 1.09 -0.74 0.138 0.428 12.22 2560.5 -0.08  35 13:50-13:55 716 0.005 0.72 -0.72 0.124 -0.013 11.38 2095.3 -0.143 
12 10:25-10:30 716 -0.0024 0.59 -0.79 0.129 -0.75 9.81 1450.2 -0.09  36 13:55-14:00 716 0.0052 0.69 -0.59 0.126 0.336 9.41 1241.1 -0.137 
13 10:30-10:35 716 0.0064 0.82 -1.21 0.136 -0.86 16.43 5472 -0.08  37 14:00-14:05 716 0.0029 0.57 -0.7 0.125 -0.394 8.69 985.1 -0.135 
14 10:35-10:40 716 0.0017 0.86 -1.09 0.137 -0.09 14.68 4070.3 -0.08  38 14:05-14:10 716 0.003 0.57 -0.7 0.136 -0.25 7.8 694.6 -0.132 
15 10:40-10:45 716 -0.0032 0.98 -0.57 0.131 1.103 12.21 2674.9 -0.08  39 14:10-14:15 716 0.0043 1.12 -0.7 0.136 0.903 15.78 4967.7 -0.127 
16 10:45-10:50 716 -0.0088 0.86 -0.65 0.13 0.396 10.74 1807.2 -0.09  40 14:15-14:20 716 0.0032 1.14 -0.65 0.142 0.939 13.29 3266.1 -0.124 
17 10:50-10:55 716 -0.0051 0.72 -0.52 0.116 0.524 9.16 1165.5 -0.09  41 14:20-14:25 716 -0.0034 1.01 -1.02 0.144 -0.427 13.06 3038.3 -0.127 
18 10:55-11:00 716 -0.0068 0.86 -0.52 0.119 0.94 12.32 2699.3 -0.1  42 14:25-14:30 716 -0.0044 0.57 -0.76 0.137 -0.435 7.81 713.3 -0.132 
19 11:00-11:05 716 -0.0141 0.68 -0.98 0.117 -0.19 15.61 4746.4 -0.12  43 14:30-14:35 716 0.0052 0.9 -0.75 0.15 0.245 8.91 1050.9 -0.127 
20 11:05-11:10 716 -0.0135 0.57 -0.69 0.111 -0.11 8.75 987.7 -0.13  44 14:35-14:40 716 0.0019 0.88 -0.87 0.154 -0.218 9 1079.1 -0.125 
21 11:10-11:15 716 -0.0072 0.53 -0.9 0.112 -0.62 12.42 2692.7 -0.14  45 14:40-14:45 716 -0.0149 0.75 -0.97 0.158 -0.718 9.1 1172.2 -0.14 
22 11:15-11:20 716 -0.0107 0.47 -0.76 0.1 -0.59 10.38 1668.6 -0.15  46 14:45-14:50 716 -0.0208 0.67 -1.45 0.148 -1.452 18.15 7096.5 -0.16 
23 11:20-11:25 716 -0.0072 0.48 -0.65 0.096 -1.11 12.52 2852 -0.15  47 14:50-14:55 716 -0.0078 0.74 -0.95 0.128 -0.94 13.55 3427.7 -0.168 
24 11:25-11:30 716 0.0125 0.68 -1.76 0.123 -4.67 69.55 134743 -0.14  48 14:55-15:00 716 0.1017 0.77 -0.44 0.116 0.193 7.96 738.5 -0.067 
 Overnight 715 0.0655 8.70 -2.26 0.623 8.22 101.477 296966    All 34368 -0.0014 2.39 -2.39 0.146 -0.024 22.422 540173  
Note: All does not include overnight returns 
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Table 4  Mean intraday 5-minute returns by trading time in 
percentage of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002 
       
No Time Returns  No Time Returns 
       
1 9:30-9:35 0.0306 c  25 13:00-13:05 0.0036 
2 9:35-9:40 -0.0403 c  26 13:05-13:10 -0.0252 c 
3 9:40-9:45 -0.0110 a  27 13:10-13:15 -0.0179 c 
4 9:45-9:50 -0.0025  28 13:15-13:20 -0.0049 
5 9:50-9:55 -0.0070  29 13:20-13:25 -0.0002 
6 9:55-10:00 -0.0103  30 13:25-13:30 0.0027 
7 10:00-10:05 -0.0080  31 13:30-13:35 0.0056 
8 10:05-10:10 -0.0090  39 14:10-14:15 0.0043 
9 10:10-10:15 -0.0062  40 14:15-14:20 0.0032 
10 10:15-10:20 -0.0114 a  41 14:20-14:25 -0.0034 
11 10:20-10:25 -0.0071  42 14:25-14:30 -0.0044 
12 10:25-10:30 -0.0024  43 14:30-14:35 0.0052 
13 10:30-10:35 0.0064  44 14:35-14:40 0.0019 
14 10:35-10:40 0.0017  45 14:40-14:45 -0.0149 c 
15 10:40-10:45 -0.0032  46 14:45-14:50 -0.0208 c 
16 10:45-10:50 -0.0088  47 14:50-14:55 -0.0078 
17 10:50-10:55 -0.0051  48 14:55-15:00 0.1017 c 
18 10:55-11:00 -0.0068     
19 11:00-11:05 -0.0141 b   Overnight 0.0655 c 
20 11:05-11:10 -0.0135 b   All -0.0014 
21 11:10-11:15 -0.0072     
22 11:15-11:20 -0.0107 a   F-test 12.073*** 
23 11:20-11:25 -0.0072   KW-test 1119*** 
24 11:25-11:30 0.0125 b     
Notes: (1) F-test is the F statistic testing the equality of the intraday 
returns. (2) KW-test is the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis statistic 
testing the equality of the intraday returns. (3) 10% level of 
significance: *. 5% level of significance: **.  1% level of 
significance: ***. (4) 10% level of significance: a. 5% level of 
significance: b. 1% level of significance: c. 
 31 
 
Table 5   Mean 5-minute return standard deviations of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 
- 2002 (in Percentage) 
No. Time 
Standard 
deviations  No. Time 
Standard 
deviations 
1 9:30-9:35 0.363  25 13:00-13:05 0.194 
2 9:35-9:40 0.266  26 13:05-13:10 0.091 
3 9:40-9:45 0.201  27 13:10-13:15 0.106 
4 9:45-9:50 0.151  28 13:15-13:20 0.093 
5 9:50-9:55 0.151  29 13:20-13:25 0.097 
6 9:55-10:00 0.141  30 13:25-13:30 0.109 
7 10:00-10:05 0.125  31 13:30-13:35 0.117 
8 10:05-10:10 0.153  32 13:35-13:40 0.114 
9 10:10-10:15 0.135  33 13:40-13:45 0.114 
10 10:15-10:20 0.150  34 13:45-13:50 0.134 
11 10:20-10:25 0.138  35 13:50-13:55 0.124 
12 10:25-10:30 0.129  36 13:55-14:00 0.126 
13 10:30-10:35 0.136  37 14:00-14:05 0.125 
14 10:35-10:40 0.137  38 14:05-14:10 0.136 
15 10:40-10:45 0.131  39 14:10-14:15 0.136 
16 10:45-10:50 0.130  40 14:15-14:20 0.142 
17 10:50-10:55 0.116  41 14:20-14:25 0.144 
18 10:55-11:00 0.119  42 14:25-14:30 0.137 
19 11:00-11:05 0.117  43 14:30-14:35 0.150 
20 11:05-11:10 0.111  44 14:35-14:40 0.154 
21 11:10-11:15 0.112  45 14:40-14:45 0.158 
22 11:15-11:20 0.100  46 14:45-14:50 0.148 
23 11:20-11:25 0.096  47 14:50-14:55 0.128 
24 11:25-11:30 0.123  48 14:55-15:00 0.116 
     Overnight 0.623 
     All 0.146 
     Levene-test  43.83*** 
     
Brown-Forsythe 
test 43.021*** 
Notes: *: 10% level of significance;  **: 5% level of significance. ***: 1% level of significance. 
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Figure 1 Interdaily mean return, variance and variance ratio, the 
Shanghai Composite Index, 2000-2002
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Note: vratio means variance ratios. 
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 Figure 2 The mean 5-minute intraday returns in percentage and return volatility based on 
standard deviations of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002. 
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